The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) has a duty to regulate the legal profession in the public interest. That duty must include protecting vulnerable clients, especially when they are harmed by the very professionals they had trusted to help them.

The recent decision of the Divisional Court in Aubin v Law Society of Ontario (released on July 29, 2026) is a victory for those who believe that the LSO’s rules must be applied in a manner consistent with its broader public interest role. Protecting the public should not simply mean regulating lawyers; it should also mean ensuring vulnerable clients have meaningful protection when the legal system fails them.

The LSO Guidelines on compensation do not purport to limit the Compensation Fund Subcommittee’s (“the Subcommittee’s”) discretion. However, the Subcommittee, in response to a request for compensation by Ms. Aubin, relied on the narrow definition of “loss” in its Guidelines to deny her claim rather than looking at Ms. Aubin’s compelling circumstances.  Criticizing the narrow approach adopted by the Compensation Fund Subcommittee in interpreting its powers, the Divisional Court found that the Subcommittee improperly fettered its discretion by treating its Guidelines as if they were binding.

The Case for Victim Compensation to LSO

The details of Ms. Aubin’s case for victim compensation are summarized in the Divisional Court’s decision, and the material facts have also been confirmed in other civil and criminal proceedings in Ontario. In June 2022, the applicant, Leanne Aubin, retained a lawyer, James Bowie, to represent her on a criminal charge of assault with a weapon based on an allegation that she had thrown a plastic pitcher at a man in a bar. Mr. Bowie requested a retainer that the applicant was not able to afford. After making an application for legal aid in August 2022 and being denied, the applicant asked Mr. Bowie whether he would accept a payment plan, and he agreed.

After several weeks, Mr. Bowie proposed to the applicant that he would provide her with legal representation in exchange for oral sex every 2 weeks. The applicant refused and suggested instead a revised payment schedule. Mr. Bowie continued to insist on sexual acts and sent her explicit photos of his genitals. When the applicant expressed that she was suffering from mental distress and having suicidal thoughts, Mr. Bowie suggested that he could reduce her stress by having sexual intercourse with him, as well as consuming alcohol and drugs. Mr. Bowie then informed the applicant that if she told anyone about his communication with her, it could jeopardize her criminal case.

In September 2022, the applicant retained another lawyer who arranged to have the charge against her withdrawn within two weeks. She then made a complaint to the Law Society about Mr. Bowie’s misconduct, which initiated an investigation. Mr. Bowie’s license to practice law was then suspended on January 27, 2023 and eventually revoked on December 1, 2025.  In November 2022, Mr. Bowie identified the applicant by name on a public social media platform chat. He stated that she had fabricated the LSO complaint to avoid paying him, that she was the one who sent intimate images and that she was a drug user.

The applicant commenced a civil proceeding against Mr. Bowie for breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Human Rights Code and defamation. On January 10, 2024 (Aubin v. Bowie, 2024 ONSC 5688), a motion by the applicant for default judgment in her civil claim was granted, and she was awarded damages totalling $195,000.000 as well as costs of $40,000.

On April 24, 2023, Mr. Bowie was arrested and charged with threatening death, criminal harassment and extortion based on his conduct towards the applicant and the allegation that he had asked another person to obtain a firearm for him as he needed the applicant “gone.” In March 2025, Mr. Bowie was convicted of criminal harassment, extortion and uttering threats.

On October 6, 2025, Ms. Aubin applied to the LSO Compensation Fund seeking compensation for a loss in $230,000.000 which represents the damages and costs from the civil judgment. The Fund was created by the LSO to assist individuals who have suffered losses as a result of dishonesty on the part of a lawyer or paralegal.  Ms. Aubin’s application was denied by the Subcommittee. Under the basis for denial, the Minutes of the Subcommittee reference the narrow definition of “loss” under section 8 of its Guidelines.

Ms. Aubin challenged the LSO’S denial of her compensation application to the Divisional Court, arguing that the LSO’s Subcommittee fettered its own discretion by treating the Guidelines as binding thereby rendering the decision unreasonable.

Divisional Court finds LSO Fettered its Discretion

The Divisional Court accepted Ms. Aubin’s submission that the Subcommittee’s decision was the result of fettered discretion and therefore unreasonable.

In its reasons for decision, the Court found that the “General Guidelines for the Determination of Grants From the Compensation Fund” (“ the Guidelines”) definition of the term “loss” is restrictive, but that section 51(5) of the Law Society Act (“LSA”) states that a loss is sustained by a person “in consequence of… dishonesty or in connection with any trust of which he or she was or is a trustee.” The LSA refers to more than simply misappropriated trust funds and includes any loss “in connection with” the lawyer’s professional business. The Court noted that language used in the Decision Letter from counsel for the Fund also supported the conclusion that the Subcommittee fettered its discretion. The letter specifically referred to the term “loss” being defined by the Guidelines and did not exercise its discretion to decide whether the loss in this case justified a grant from the Fund.

Despite the broad grant of discretion pursuant to section 51(5) of the LSA, the Subcommittee did not consider factors other than whether the loss in this case met the definition in the Guidelines. As plainly stated in the Preface of the Guidelines, the Guidelines are not intended to be binding or to fetter the discretion of the Subcommittee. The fact that no other factors were considered supported the Court’s conclusion that the Subcommittee did not appropriately exercise its discretion and, instead, denied the claim relying on the restrictive definition of the Guidelines.

Positive Implications for Victims Rights

Victims of crimes, particularly crimes of sexual exploitation, have few available avenues of civil redress. Criminal procedure does not provide compensation, and civil litigation is exacting, taking a heavy toll on the plaintiff, while financial recovery depends upon the solvency and means of the defendant. In cases involving criminal misconduct by lawyers, it is significant that the Divisional Court has effectively recognized that the LSO’s compensation regime may be available to potentially respond to the glaring systemic gap. This recognition resonates with the LSO’s role of acting in the public interest and promoting fairness and accountability in its regulatory function.

And finally, it is important to note that this case would not have been possible without the courage of the applicant, Ms. Aubin, who endured the weight of legal procedures necessary to establish the material facts in support of her claim.  Nor would it have been possible without the tenacity of her lawyers at Champ Law, Emilie Taman and Christine Johnson, who routinely do advocacy in the public interest demonstrative of the highest values of the profession.

By Assma Galuta* & Yavar Hameed

*Assma Galuta is completing her paralegal student placement with Hameed Law.